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This article suggests that narrative studies would benefit from (hermeneutically 
informed) philosophical reflection on the basic assumptions underlying 
different conceptions of narrative, a sense of history in conceptualizing 
narrative and experience, and nuanced reflection on the significance of 
narrative for agency and our sense of the possible. It argues for conceptualizing 
narrative as an interpretative, dialogical, and performative activity of cultural 
sense-making that is integral to how we understand our past, present, and future 
possibilities. It proposes three ways in which acknowledging the historicity of 
experience allows us to explore how narratives shape historical imagination. 
Arguing for approaching literary narratives as explorations of human 
possibilities, the article ends by showing, through an analysis of Michel 
Houellebecq’s Submission (2015), how narrative fiction can contribute to our 
sense of the possible and to our understanding of narrative agency. 
 
 
Literary scholars like to think that it was their discipline that 
started the whole business of narrative studies, which has now exploded 
and extended across all fields that study human reality.1 Sometimes they 
go as far as suggesting that they are therefore the ultimate experts in the 
study of narrative and that narrative scholars in other fields should learn 
from literary narratologists to make proper distinctions. These 
narratologists typically frown upon social scientists if they venture to use 
the concepts of narrative and story interchangeably, as this is perhaps the 
most fundamental distinction to which any student of literature embarking 
                                                        
1 On the roots of narrative theory in early twentieth-century narrative poetics (such as 
Russian formalism), see Herman, 2006. 
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upon the study of narrative will be initiated. Although I distinguish 
between story and narrative, I often feel like a rare bird in literary 
narrative studies, for I have generally more in common with 
philosophical, psychological, and social scientific approaches to narrative 
than with the formalist tradition of literary narratology. I believe that not 
only other narrative scholars have much to learn from literary narrative 
scholars but also the latter have much to learn from the former—going all 
the way to their basic assumptions about the concept of narrative. Over 
the past two decades, narrative studies has been marked by a general 
aspiration towards interdisciplinarity and a more intense dialogue 
between literary and social scientific approaches. Nevertheless, more 
could be done to enhance such dialogue, and I, for my part, would like to 
participate in the effort to bridge some of the still existing disciplinary 
divides. 
In my view, perhaps the most important thing that literary scholars 
could learn from other narrative scholars is the courage to engage with the 
“big questions” that concern the function and significance of narrative for 
life, identity, agency, and cultural self-understanding. When I was 
embarking on my university studies, I was undecided between 
philosophy, psychology, and literary studies but eventually decided to 
major in comparative literature because I was fascinated by the way in 
which narrative fiction deals with the most fundamental philosophical and 
existential issues in a concrete form, that is, in narrative—rather than in 
abstract—terms, which involves acknowledging the cultural 
embeddedness, relationality, and situatedness of our being in the world. 
What drew me to literature was precisely its relevance for life, for our 
reflection on who we are and who we could be. When I started my PhD 
studies, interdisciplinary narrative studies was starting to take shape as a 
field defined by intensive and exciting discussions between scholars with 
divergent disciplinary backgrounds.2 It was hugely exciting to find a 
world that allowed me to go beyond the narrow discipline of literary 
studies and to bring together my interests in philosophy, society, culture, 
and literature.  
                                                        
2 For me, the landmark event that properly initiated me to the world of interdisciplinary 
narrative studies was the international conference The Travelling Concept of Narrative 
(Helsinki, 2004). Matti Hyvärinen was the main organizer of the conference, and just as 
fruitful was the 2010 follow-up symposium, Travelling Concepts of Narrative II, which 
he organized in London and which led to the publication of The Travelling Concepts of 
Narrative (Hyvärinen, Hatavara, & Hydén, 2013). 
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Nevertheless, despite the increasing dialogue over the past few 
decades, I have been struck by the extent to which the literary 
narratological and social scientific segment of narrative studies have 
remained largely separate fields of inquiry. The narratological tradition 
that draws on the formalist and structuralist legacy still predominates in 
literary narrative studies. This legacy is visible, for example, in the way in 
which interest in narrative structures and techniques dominate at the 
expense of narrative as a cultural sense-making practice; as a way of 
thinking about subjectivity, identity, and agency; as an exploration of 
past, present, and future worlds; and as a form of existential and ethical 
inquiry.3 As the drive towards systematicism has always been a defining 
feature of narratology, it has been marked by universalist aspirations at 
the expense of a historical sensibility. This remains the case in 
contemporary “postclassical” narratology characterized by the 
“cognitivist paradigm shift” (Fludernik, 2006, p. 51). A taxonomic 
aspiration—the attempt to systematically classify different types of 
narrative representation, for example—is privileged at the expense of 
exploring literature as a form of cultural self-understanding.4 The 
scientistic tendency of many narratologists is linked to an inclination 
towards highly technical, scientific-sounding terminology, intelligible 
only to fellow narratologists and modeled after linguistics or cognitive 
science. A completely different starting point is offered by the 
hermeneutic approach to narrative, which proceeds from the assumption 
that narratives are cultural sense-making practices and that narrative 
studies should contribute to cultural self-understanding and hence be 
accessible to a wider audience. 
I have always been interested first and foremost in the existential 
dimension of narrative that goes beyond the scope of—or is at best 
marginal in—literary narratology: Who are we and who could we be? 
How do narratives mediate the ways in which we address these questions 
as we struggle to understand ourselves and others in time? I would like to 
contribute to the kind of narrative studies that deals with these major 
                                                        
3 Narratology is commonly defined as “a theory of narrative” (Prince, 1995, p. 110; 
Nünning, 2003, pp. 227–228), which “co-exists with other theories of narrative,” or “a 
discipline or an approach to narrative” that is “dedicated to the study of the logic, 
principles, and practices of narrative representation” (Meister, 2014). It is nowadays, 
however, a diverse, heterogeneous field, and also includes many areas (such as culture-
sensitive narratology and narrative ethics) which are highly relevant for my own 
approach. 
4 As Herman puts it, from the beginning, the “aims of narratology were . . . 
fundamentally taxonomic and descriptive” (2006, p. 30). 
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philosophical questions while at the same time cultivating a sensitivity to 
the cultural and historical mediatedness of our narrative agency. Hence, 
as concerns the direction in which I wish to develop narrative studies, I 
would like to see more (hermeneutically informed) philosophical 
reflection on the basic assumptions underlying different approaches to 
narrative, more historical reflection, in connection to a more historical 
conception of experience and narrative, and more nuanced reflection on 
the significance of narrative for agency and our sense of the possible. In 
what follows, I will discuss the first two from a perspective informed by 
the third, and I will then briefly analyze, in relation to my theoretical 
reflections, a contemporary novel that is currently a topic of heated 
debate, Michel Houellebecq’s (2015) Soumission (Submission). 
 
Narrative Hermeneutics and Other Philosophies of Narrative 
 
My work in narrative studies has been motivated by the belief that 
in the current phase of narrative studies, with its increasing 
interdisciplinarity and expanding scope, what is particularly needed is 
reflection on the philosophical assumptions underlying different traditions 
of theorizing narrative. In an effort to contribute to such reflection, I have 
analyzed the philosophical underpinnings of different conceptions of 
narrative both as they are developed in various narrative theories and as 
they structure literary fiction (Meretoja, 2013, 2014a, 2014b). In 
particular, I have been interested in how the ways in which we 
conceptualize and evaluate narrative depend on our philosophical 
assumptions about what is real, that is, on our ontological assumptions. 
For example, if we assume that reality is given to us in immediate sense 
perception, we are likely to take narrative to be a matter of distorting the 
real. This is what Galen Strawson (2004), for example, assumes when he 
claims that our experiences are distorted every time we engage in 
narrative reflection on them or even just reminisce about them: allegedly, 
recent neuroscientific research has shown that it is  
 
an inevitable consequence of the mechanics of the 
neurophysiological process of laying down memories that every 
studied conscious recall of past events brings an alteration. The 
implication is plain: the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, 
the further you risk moving away from accurate self-
understanding, from the truth of your being. (p. 447)  
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Such “alteration” looks less questionable if we acknowledge that living is 
a temporal process of constant reinterpretation of experiences (which 
makes it a process of ceaseless alteration), that experience is necessarily 
always already mediated, and that cultural webs of narratives take part in 
mediating how we perceive and make sense of the world, ourselves, and 
other people (see Meretoja, 2014a). However, instead of repeating my 
earlier arguments here, I will briefly reflect on why it is that the 
existential-ontological significance of narratives for human existence has 
been neglected in literary narrative studies, and I will put forward my 
own suggestion of how to conceptualize narrative in terms of a culturally 
mediated, dialogical, and ethically charged interpretative activity. 
Narratology has traditionally studied narrative first and foremost 
as a matter of representing events. According to the standard 
narratological definition, “narrative is the representation of an event or a 
series of events” (Abbott, 2008, p. 13). Many narratologists also highlight 
that causality and chronology are interconnected in narrative 
representations. In Roland Barthes’ (1982) famous definition, “the 
mainspring of narrative is precisely the confusion of consecution and 
consequence, what comes after being read as what is caused by; in which 
case narrative would be a systematic application of the logical fallacy 
denounced by Scholasticism in the formula post hoc, ergo propter hoc—a 
good motto for Destiny” (p. 94). According to Marie-Laure Ryan (2007), 
the “sequence of events must form a unified causal chain” (p. 29), and in 
Gregory Currie’s (2010) terms, narratives “represent sustained temporal-
causal relations between particulars” (p. 27). The notion of representation 
suggests that narrative represents a narrative order that pre-exists its 
telling. As Porter Abbott (2008) puts it, narrative is a representation 
because it is “conveying a story that at least seems to pre-exist the vehicle 
of conveyance” (p. 15), even if the story only exists through being 
narrated. Many narrative theorists and novelists find narrative inherently 
suspicious precisely because it allegedly pretends to mirror a meaningful 
(chronological-causal) order that can be found in the world, although in 
reality such order is merely a human projection.5 According to this view, 
there is a basic discrepancy between the real and narrative representation 
of the real. It is from such a position that Hayden White (1981), for 
example, argues: “Real events should simply be; they can perfectly well 
serve as the referents of a discourse, can be spoken about, but they should 
not pose as the tellers of a narrative” (p. 4). 
                                                        
5 For an analysis of such suspicion in (particularly French) postwar thought and fiction, 
see Meretoja 2014b. 
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The representational thinking that dominates narrative studies is 
linked to a tendency to posit a hierarchy between events/experiences and 
narrative: there are first events/experiences and they are then, 
retrospectively, narrativized. Narrative is considered to be always 
secondary, as what is projected on the pure, raw, disconnected 
events/experiences. According to the narratological dogma, narrative 
always comes afterwards, and living and telling cannot take place 
simultaneously: “Life tells us that we cannot tell it while we live it or live 
it while we tell it. Live now, tell later” (Cohn 1999, p. 96). Literary 
narratologists share this assumption with such antinarrativists as Crispin 
Sartwell (2000) and Galen Strawson (2004) as well as with such 
philosophers of history as Louis Mink (1970) and Hayden White (1981). 
They all rely on the (tacit empiricist-positivistic) assumption that the 
world is given to us in raw, unmediated experience, and that narrative is a 
retrospective representation of experiences or events.  
The hermeneutic approach problematizes precisely this 
assumption. It emphasizes the mediatedness of experience—that 
experience is always already temporally, historically, culturally, and 
socially mediated and that it has an interpretative structure. As Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1997) puts it, experience, even simple sense perception, 
“always includes meaning” (p. 92): all experience involves 
“understanding of something as something. All understanding-as is an 
articulation of what is there, in that it looks-away-from, looks-at, sees-
together-as. . . . Seeing means articulating” (pp. 90–91). The way in 
which our experience is organized is mediated by the cultural narrative 
webs in which we are entangled. Hence, narratives are not merely a 
matter of retrospective interpretation but shape the way we experience 
things in the first place. Narrative interpretation is part and parcel of the 
process of living our lives. From a hermeneutic perspective, living and 
telling are constantly entangled in complex ways that undermine a 
hierarchical conception of their relationship. In Jerome Bruner’s (1987) 
words, “life is not ‘how it was’ but how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, 
told and retold” (p. 31). 
Narrative hermeneutics is a philosophical approach to narrative 
that conceptualizes narratives as cultural practices of sense-making, 
which have an interpretative structure (see Brockmeier & Meretoja, 2014; 
Meretoja, 2014b). Seeing narratives as interpretative practices 
foregrounds that narratives mediate our relation to ourselves, others, and 
the world. It emphasizes the socio-cultural character of narratives, and the 
relational, dialogical way in which we become who we are in relation to 
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other people, their stories, and culturally-mediated narrative models of 
sense-making. Individual narratives are always woven in relation to 
cultural narratives that they perpetuate, vary, challenge, and transform.  
My interest in narrative largely grew out of my interest in issues 
of subjectivity, identity, and agency, which I came to study in the context 
of the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition of thought, Bakhtinian 
dialogism, as well as French poststructuralism and its discussion of the 
“death of the subject.” Narrative provided me a way of rethinking 
subjectivity from a perspective that rejected the essentialist idea of a 
substantialist core self and acknowledged the fundamental temporality, 
processuality, and relationality of our existence. I wanted to build on the 
Ricoeurian approach to the subject as a dynamic temporal process 
constituted in the continuous reinterpretation of cultural narratives, and to 
blend this hermeneutic approach with a Foucauldian and Bakhtinian 
emphasis on the fundamental role played by power in the constitution of 
subjectivity, identity, and agency. What I attempted to do was to rethink 
both subjectivity and narrative in terms of dialogicality (Meretoja, 
2014b).  
The dialogical conception of narrative, subjectivity, and agency 
emphasizes that cultural webs of narratives only exist through individual 
interpretations, and individual subjects, in turn, are constituted in relation 
to cultural narrative webs. Acknowledging this two-way reciprocal 
relationship and interdependency allows us to avoid reifying cultural 
narratives (and social systems of meaning more generally) and to account 
both for the socially conditioned nature of subjectivity and for the 
subject’s capacity for active agency. As the sociocultural systems of 
meaning— including narrative webs—cannot determine how they will be 
interpreted and since all interpretation takes place in different socio-
historical situations, ultimately all understanding is characterized by the 
structure of “always-understanding-differently” (“Immer-anders-
Verstehen”, Gadamer, 1993, p. 8). As Catriona Mackenzie (2008) puts it, 
the notion of narrative agency suggests that “to be a person is to exercise 
narrative capacities for self-interpretation,” which bring about “the 
integration of self over time,” and that such “narrative integration is 
dynamic, provisional and open to change and revision” (pp. 11–12). For 
me, the concept is useful in emphasizing that culturally mediated 
narrative (self-)interpretations take part in constituting us as subjects 
capable of action while simultaneously acknowledging that, as agents of 
narrative interpretation, we are both constituting and constituted.  
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I endorse a narrative hermeneutics which, instead of thinking of 
narrative interpretation in terms of mere representation, acknowledges its 
productive and performative dimension: narrative interpretations take part 
in constituting and shaping human reality. Narrative interpretations are 
social acts of bestowing meaning on experiences and events, and they 
participate in shaping the world. They have real, material effects: they 
perpetuate, challenge and transform the way in which we see and act in 
the world.6 Another way of conceptualizing the performative dimension 
of narrative interpretations is to say that they are inevitably ethically and 
politically charged. As Ricoeur (1992, p. 140) puts it, no narrative can be 
ethically neutral. Narratives always provide certain perspectives to the 
world, and through those perspectives they participate in meaning-making 
that shapes and transforms intersubjective reality.  
I would like to argue for a conception of narrative that makes 
interpretation the key concept in understanding narrative. While 
narratives themselves are interpretations, our engagement with them is 
also an interpretative activity, and it takes place in the world in which we 
are always already entangled in narrative webs that function as 
interpretative frameworks. From the perspective of narrative 
hermeneutics, it is hence absurd that the study of narrative and the interest 
in theorizing interpretation have often seemed to be mutually exclusive, 
particularly in literary narratology.7 I have suggested that if we take 
seriously the hermeneutic view of the interpretative structure of all 
experience, narratives can be conceptualized as interpretations of 
interpretations because they concern human reality that is itself 
interpretatively constituted. Hence, I have used the notion of double 
hermeneutics to describe the interpretative character of narratives, and the 
notion of triple hermeneutics to characterize the way in which we 
reinterpret our experiences in the light of cultural and historical 
narratives. The latter concept emphasizes these three interpretative layers: 
the basic interpretative structure of experience, narrative interpretations of 
                                                        
6 This productive, performative dimension of interpretations is acknowledged in the 
thinking of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Bakhtin; for all of them, 
understanding is our way of being in the world as embodied beings, and interpretations 
are constitutive of social reality. On the productivity of narratives in a Foucauldian 
approach to narratives, see Tamboukou, 2013. 
7 As Liesbeth Korthals Altes (2014) puts it, “scientificity has often been considered to 
come proportionally to one’s distancing from interpretation, and from hermeneutics 
more generally,” and this tendency has been coupled with narratology’s “lack of 
systematic interest in the social dimensions and, hence, the diversity of interpretive 
processes” (p. 19). 
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experience, and (transformative) reinterpretations of experiences in the 
light of culturally mediated narratives. In practice, these layers are 
interlaced but it can be useful to separate them analytically in order to 
gain a differentiated view of the complexity of the interrelations between 
interpretation, experience, and narrative.8 
While the way we conceptualize narrative largely depends on our 
ontological assumptions about the nature of human existence and 
experience, it is also the case that our views on the nature of reality 
crucially affect our take on the ontology of literary narratives. If literary 
narratives are narrative interpretations, what kinds of narrative 
interpretations are they? The narratological approach that conceptualizes 
narrative in terms of a representation of a series of events is dominated by 
the (empiricist-positivistic) view that literary narratives, as fictive, 
invented narratives, can have no truth value (Cohn, 1999, p. 15; Doležel, 
2010, pp. 36–42). This assumption is implicit even in the rhetoric 
approach in which fictionality is defined by contrasting fictional 
discourse with what is “actual, factual and real” (Nielsen, Phelan, & 
Walsh, 2015).9 If we acknowledge that our being in the world is mediated 
through narrative interpretations of what human existence is about, 
literary narratives can be seen to play a crucial role in shaping these 
interpretations and hence our ways of being in the world with others. 
When narratives are seen as interpretations of the real, they are not 
opposed to what is actual, factual, and real; in contrast, both fictive and 
non-fictive narratives take part in shaping our view of what is actual, 
factual, and real. Instead of merely representing what is, they open up 
new ways of seeing what is and can expand our sense of what is possible 
for us. Instead of linking the imaginative dimension of literary narratives 
to the status of the “unreal,” I would like to emphasize their power to 
explore possibilities of human existence. Precisely this power lies at the 
heart of narrative fiction: it is about exploring human possibilities. 
My interest in the possible ties in with the work of narrative 
scholars like Paul Ricoeur, Jerome Bruner, Jens Brockmeier, and Molly 
Andrews, all of whom have studied narrative in terms of the possible. For 
Ricoeur (1991), to understand a literary narrative is “not to find a lifeless 
sense that is contained therein, but to unfold the possibility of being 
indicated by the text” (p. 66). In a similar spirit, for Bruner (1986), 
narrating is “being in the subjunctive mode,” “a trafficking in human 
                                                        
8 On triple hermeneutics, see Meretoja, 2014a. 
9 For a fuller discussion of the problematic dichotomy between the actual, factual, and 
real and the possible, fictional, and unreal, see Meretoja, 2015. 
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possibilities rather than in settled certainties” (p. 25). Brockmeier (2015) 
articulates the role of narrative imagination in envisioning our options for 
acting: 
 
Narrative imagination enables us to probe the reach and range of 
our options—in Bruner’s words, their alternativeness—both in 
everyday and literary discourse and thought. . . . If meanings are 
options for acting, then narrative appears to be the most advanced 
practice by which we can envision, scrutinize, and try out these 
options. . . . We all continuously sort out real and fictive, 
contrasting and competing versions of actions, or inactions, we 
play them through and reflect on them, imagine possible and 
impossible scenarios and speculate about their implications. (pp. 
120–122)  
 
Andrews (2014), in turn, draws on the Sartrean theory of imagination, 
which takes as its starting-point “our ability to see things not only as they 
are, but as they are not” and to see that the “not-real might also be the 
not-yet-real” (pp. 5–6). As she puts it, imagination is a “social faculty,” 
which “extends from the ‘real’, the world as we know it, to the world of 
the possible” and “is manifested as we think about our lives as they have 
been lived, and as they might be led” (pp. 7, 10). 
I find the concept of narrative imagination useful in many ways, 
not the least because it invites reflection on the futurity of narrative 
thought: narratives are about imagining what could be. The aspect of 
futurity is crucial to the process of narrative reflection, which, as Mark 
Freeman (2014) acknowledges, concerns the values and ethical ideals 
towards which we strive: “Rather than thinking of narrative mainly in 
terms of its orientation to the past, I have tried to suggest that it bears 
upon the future as well: the process of rewriting the self is at one and the 
same time a process of articulating the self-to-be, or the self that ought to 
be” (p. 14). 
This is a perspective that tends to be absent from narrative 
approaches that conceptualize narrative in terms of a representation of a 
series of events. While representational accounts of narrative frequently 
suggest that narratives present the represented events as part of a 
chronological-causal chain defined by necessity, the hermeneutic 
approach acknowledges that narratives can make visible the openness and 
unpredictability of the moment of action—in Brockmeier’s (2015) terms, 
“narrative’s specific sensitivity for the openness and unpredictability of 
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human affairs” (p. 120). This is in line with Hannah Arendt’s (1998) idea 
of the human condition as being characterized by our capacity to act and 
thereby to bring into the world something new and unpredictable. 
Given that what is so fascinating about narrative fiction is its 
capacity to open up new possibilities of human existence, it is astonishing 
how difficult it is to find in literary narrative studies considerations of 
how the possibilities of fictive worlds can feed into, shape, and transform 
the possibilities in our real world. In my recent work, I have been 
particularly interested in the ways in which literary narratives contribute 
to the process in which we imagine the past and the future in relation to 
the present, and in the subsequent sections I will briefly explore these two 




Since the beginning of the 21st century, narrative scholars have 
voiced the need to historicize narratology (e.g. Fludernik, 2003; Nünning, 
2009), but only in the recent years there has been more serious interest 
among narratologists in the relationship between experience and history 
and in the concept of historical experience (Fludernik, 2010). This is 
significant because precisely the notion of experience is central to 
postclassical, mainly cognitively oriented narratology, in contrast to the 
way in which classical narratology conceptualized the logic of narrative 
in terms of representing events. Decisive in this respect has been Monika 
Fludernik’s (1996) Towards a “Natural” Narratology where she defines, 
in the wake of Paul Ricoeur’s (1983-1985/1984-1988) Temps et récit, 
narrativity in terms of experientiality and thereby makes central the 
subject of experience. However, the conception of experience that has 
dominated cognitive narratology has arguably remained rather ahistorical 
and linked to assumptions of the universality and immediacy of 
experience.  
Let us first have a look at the philosophical assumptions that 
underlie Fludernik’s (2010) conception of historical experience. She 
distinguishes between two ways of applying the notion of historical 
experience:  
 
On the one hand, one can speak of our present-day experiencing 
of the Afghan War or, in history, of the Elizabethans’ experience 
of the war in Ireland. . . . Type two of historical experience, which 
I would call past historical experience, corresponds to our present-
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day experience of historicity when encountering representations of 
historical subjects and/or periods. (pp. 42–43)  
 
She adds that because people mostly experience “historically relevant 
figurations . . . through the media, i.e. indirectly,” one may want to create 
a third category for “direct physical experience of processes and events 
such as raw experience,” exemplified by soldiers’ experience of war (p. 
42). Underlying this view is an empiricist-positivistic conception of 
experience: the assumption that experience of events is immediately 
given, raw, and not historical except in some rare, special cases, as when 
it concerns “historical events” such as war.  
All Fludernik’s examples of historical experiences are major 
political events, such as wars, the American moon landing, and the fall of 
the Berlin war, and she uses the concept of “historical” in a very narrow 
event-historical sense: “In order to become ‘historical’ experience (rather 
than mere experience of things happening to impinge on one), events or 
processes need to be cognized as either significant (which will cause them 
to be experienced as historic even though they are only just evolving) or 
as past” (p. 46). What is problematic in this narrow conception of history 
is that it ignores the historicity of everyday life in which apparently 
nothing much happens. And who gets to decide, and how, what counts as 
“significant”? It can be legitimately argued that the personal, subjective, 
and everyday are highly significant, and just as historically constituted as 
the events of (narrowly conceived) political history.  
I would like to suggest that narrative studies should take into 
account the historicity of everyday experience in a threefold sense. First, 
everyday experience is historical in the sense that it is historically 
conditioned, shaped by the historical world in which it is embedded. The 
historical world in which we live defines what it is possible for us to 
experience, feel, think, and do. For example, Reinhart Koselleck (1979) 
conceptualizes a historical world as a “space of experience,” 
Erfahrungsraum, in reference to how the present world is shaped by 
frameworks of meaning that set certain limits to possible experience in 
that world. A similar way of thinking underpins Gadamer’s (1997) views 
on our historical situatedness, Michel Foucault’s (1966) idea of the 
historical a priori that defines what it is possible to know and experience 
in a certain world, and Jacques Rancière’s (2013) approach to the 
(re)distribution of the sensible and thinkable. From this perspective not 
only the wars are historical but all experience, even our most everyday, 
habitual, unreflective ways of perceiving the world are historically 
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constituted. There is no raw experience: present experience is always 
mediated, temporally—through past experiences and ways of orienting 
oneself to the future (what Koselleck calls the “horizon of expectation”, 
Erwartungshorizont)—and through historically constituted cultural webs 
of meaning. 
Second, experience is historical in the sense that our 
interpretations of the past shape our space of experience in the present 
and our ways of imagining the yet-to-be. That we always interpret the 
past in relation to the present is an insight that informs contemporary 
cultural memory studies. Memory is something that we do in the present; 
like narrative, it is an interpretative activity. It is not simple retrieval of 
what is stored in our minds but rather an activity that takes place in the 
present and an integral aspect of which is a narrative process of meaning-
making (see Brockmeier, 2015). Theorists of cultural memory, such as 
Michael Rothberg (2009) and Max Silverman (2013), emphasize the 
processual and productive aspects of memory with reference to Richard 
Terdiman’s (1993) view that “memory is the past made present.” 
Rothberg argues that the “notion of a ‘making present’ has two important 
corollaries: first, that memory is a contemporary phenomenon, something 
that, while concerned with the past, happens in the present; and, second, 
that memory is a form of work, working through, labor, or action” (pp. 3–
4). Silverman, in turn, writes about a “poetics of memory” with reference 
to the past made present: “the activation of this elsewhere through 
memory, which converts the blandness of the everyday into something 
beyond ‘common sense’, is a performative and transformative act in the 
present” (p. 23). Like narrative, memory is necessarily selective, 
interpretative, and intertwined with imagination. As Ricoeur analyzes it, 
we can extend our present space of experience by drawing on the 
possibilities “buried in the actual past” (1988, pp. 191–192). 
Third, everyday experience is historical in the sense that it is the 
very stuff of history; it is what history consists of. Instead of being mere 
effects of social and historical forces, we are agents who have the 
potential to affect the course of history. In this context, I consider 
important Hannah Arendt’s (1998) insights into how “the human 
condition of natality” defines us as beings capable of revealing our 
“unique personal identities” through acting and speaking: “the new 
beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because 
the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something new” (p. 9), 
that is, of acting, which “means to take an initiative, to begin,” to set 
something new and unexpected “into motion” (pp. 177–178).  
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I would like to argue that acknowledging this threefold historicity 
of experience allows us to explore three ways in which narratives shape 
our historical imagination. First of all, it allows us to analyze the narrative 
mediatedness of experience. While standard narratological accounts 
present narrative as something that necessarily comes afterwards and 
requires “a stepping back from the events” (Fludernik, 2010, p. 46), the 
approach that acknowledges the historical and cultural mediatedness of 
experience can take into account how narratives shape experience and the 
space in which individual experience is embedded. Instead of being 
merely a matter of retrospective meaning-giving, narratives affect how we 
experience things in the first place. Literary narratives can contribute to 
our historical imagination by conveying a sense of what it was like to live 
in a particular historical world as a space of possibilities and by reflecting 
on how cultural narratives shaped that world and mediated the experience 
of its inhabitants.  
Second, narrative interpretations of the past shape our space of 
possibilities in the present. Literary narratives contribute to cultural 
memory by interpreting the past from the perspective of the present, and 
they can thereby open up new possibilities and visions of the future. For 
example, literature has played a key role in the “memory work” through 
which different generations have struggled to come to terms with the 
traumatic legacies of the Holocaust and colonialism. Jonathan Littell’s 
(2006/2009) The Kindly Ones (Les Bienveillantes) shows how National 
Socialism was linked to a logic of instrumental rationality that is not alien 
to contemporary Western society, and provokes us to reflect on how this 
legacy places ethical obligations on us in the present (see Meretoja, 
2015). The dystopian, post-apocalyptic vision of Cormac McCarthy’s 
(2006) The Road, in turn, explores the conditions of possibility of being 
human and invites us to consider our present world as the past of a future 
world—as a past in which it might still have been possible to do 
something to prevent an environmental disaster. Literary narratives 
frequently prompt us to address the question of who we are in relation to 
the cultural traditions that mediate our efforts to make sense of our past, 
present, and future possibilities.  
Third, literary narratives can contribute to historical imagination 
by helping us see how history consists of the everyday actions and 
inactions of people: that history is not taking place somewhere else, 
where the political leaders meet, but right here where our everyday lives 
unfold. In Claude Simon’s words, “History is not, as the school books 
would like to make us believe, a discontinuous series of dates, treaties and 
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spectacular battles . . . the dull existence of an old lady is History itself, 
the very stuff of History.”10 Literary and historical narratives can also 
cultivate our sense of how subjects of action are not merely historically 
conditioned but also capable of new initiatives; instead of simply 
following dominant cultural narratives, we are capable of shaping those 
narratives and creating our own ones. Narratives can help us imagine the 
openness of the past historical present: how the people of the past lived in 
an open present and made choices and decisions that shaped history, that 
is, how their present was not a predetermined part of a linear chain of 
events but an open space in which the future was in the process of being 
made. By cultivating our sense of how history unfolds through moments 
in which different possibilities are open to moral agents, fiction can work 
against reification in which history is seen in terms of a necessary 
development. Fiction can cultivate our sense of the unpredictability of 
human actions and interactions. 
 
Imagining the Future: Houellebecq’s Submission 
 
To exemplify the relevance of literary narratives as a form of 
reflecting on narrative agency and contributing to historical imagination, 
let me cast a brief look at Michel Houellebecq’s (2015) new novel, 
Submission (Soumission). Houellebecq is probably internationally the 
most famous and controversial contemporary French novelist. From the 
beginning, the reception of his work has been exceptionally mixed, and it 
has remained so, despite Prix Goncourt and his growing critical 
acclaim.11 While Houellebecq has been criticized for being pornographic, 
racist, misogynist, Islamophobic, and reactionary, many admirers of his 
novels (me included), are compelled by how they succeed in dissecting 
the pathologies of contemporary Western consumer culture. In part due to 
the narrative ambiguity of his novels, critics disagree on whether they are 
primarily diagnoses or symptoms of what they depict, that is, whether 
they embrace or criticize the pathologies of global capitalism. It is 
symptomatic of the contemporary media culture that less often than being 
based on a careful reading of his novels, the debate has focused on 
                                                        
10 “L’Histoire n’est pas, comme voudraient le faire croire les manuels scolaires, une série 
discontinue de dates, de traités et de batailles spectaculaires . . . la terne existence d’une 
vieille dame, c’est l’Histoire elle-même, la matière même de l’Histoire.” (Simon, 1958, 
pp. 35–36) 
11 For helpful overviews of this mixed reception, see Morrey (2013) and Korthals Altes 
(2014). 
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Houellebecq’s person. Yet only nuanced readings of their narrative 
strategies allow us to evaluate their ethos.12  
Submission is set in France in 2022, in a period of political turmoil 
shadowing the presidential elections after the Socialist president François 
Hollande’s second term. In the final round of the elections, the far-right 
Marine Le Pen faces Muhammed Ben Abbes’s new moderate party, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which eventually wins the elections, as the “broad 
republican coalition” backs it in order to keep Le Pen out. Instead of 
being Islamophobic, as some critics have suggested, the novel addresses 
the fear of Islam with which much of the Western world is currently 
grappling, and explores politics as an arena of struggle between different 
political narratives that provide divergent world-views, values, and 
interpretations of the past, present, and future. It depicts the current crisis 
of the Western culture as a value crisis rooted in the bankruptcy of secular 
humanism in the wake of twentieth-century totalitarianisms.  
Houellebecq is most critical of the likes of himself: white, 
Western, middle-aged, middle-class men who are trapped in their sad, 
lonely, pleasure-seeking, and self-centred lives. Such are his protagonists, 
and the I-narrator of Submission, François, makes no exception. He is a 
44-year-old professor of literature, who describes himself as being “as 
political as a bath towel” (p. 39) 13 and lives in the vacuum of values of 
the Western hedonist, individualist consumer culture. The protagonist’s 
life is financially secure, and yet he is “close to suicide, not out of despair 
or even any special sadness” but simply because the “mere will to live 
was clearly no match for the pains and aggravations that punctuate the life 
of the average Western man” (pp. 170–171).14 In his view, Europe is 
faring no better: “Europe had already committed suicide.” (p. 213)15  
Houellebecq writes within the Balzacian tradition in which the 
task of the novelist is to provide a truthful, honest account of what is 
happening in contemporary society, but unlike Balzac, whose third-
person narration aimed at objectivity, Houellebecq privileges a first-
person narrative perspective that is firmly rooted in the middle of the 
                                                        
12 As Korthals Altes (2014) insightfully shows in her book on ethos attribution, 
completely opposite ethoses have been ascribed to Houellebecq’s novels. 
13 “Je me sentais aussi politisé qu’une serviette de toilette” (p. 50). 
14 “Pourtant, je le sentais bien, je me rapprochais du suicide, sans éprouver de désespoir 
ni même de tristesse particulière . . . . La simple volonté de vivre ne me suffisait 
manifestement plus à résister à l’ensemble des douleurs et des tracas qui jalonnent la vie 
d’un Occidental moyen.” (p. 207). 
15 “L’Europe avait déjà accompli son suicide” (p. 256). 
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depicted world, au milieu du monde.16 His narrators engage in constant 
critical reflection on the social developments they observe, but never 
from a position of moral high ground—nor is such a position offered to 
the reader: “Every single one of us reeks of selfishness, masochism and 
death. We have created a system in which it has become simply 
impossible to live, and what’s more, we continue to export it” (2002, p. 
361).17 That there is no authority above the openly partial, often 
provocative and self-ironical I-narration encourages the reader to see the 
limits and biases of the narrator’s perspective and to engage in the tasks 
of assessing and interpreting. The narrator’s constant commentary creates 
a metalevel to Houellebecq’s novels, shifting the attention from what 
happens to how the story is told and to the narrator’s and readers’ 
responses to the narrated events.  
Submission explores the idea that the religions return because, 
unlike Western consumerism, they are able to address people’s 
“metaphysical questions” and their need for meaning (p. 209).18 The 
narrator’s story of his conversion to Islam ends in a utopian vision, told in 
proleptic future tense with a twist of black humor, of being surrounded by 
young brides arranged for him and whom he “would come to love”: it is a 
promise of a “second life, with very little connection to the old one” (p. 
250).19 The temptation is linked to the idea that “the summit of human 
happiness resides in the most absolute submission,” and, according to the 
converted academic who “sells” the idea to the narrator, “Islam accepts 
the world, and accepts it whole. It accepts the world as such, Nietzsche 
might say. For Buddhism, the world is dukkha—unsatisfactoriness, 
suffering. Christianity has serious reservations of its own. Isn’t Satan 
called ‘the Prince of the world’? For Islam, though, the divine creation is 
perfect, it’s an absolute masterpiece” (p. 217).20 Despite such attempts at 
                                                        
16 Au milieu du monde is the name of a series of his novels, including Lanzarote (2000) 
and Plateforme (2001). 
17 “Je sais seulement que, tous autant que nous sommes, nous puons l’égoïsme, le 
masochisme et la mort. Nous avons créé un système dans lequel il est devenu 
simplement impossible de vivre ; et, de plus, nous continuons à l’exporter.” (2001, p. 
369.) 
18 “questions métaphysiques” (p. 251). 
19 “Je parviendrais, de mon côté, à les aimer . . .; et ce serait la chance d’une deuxième 
vie, sans grand rapport avec la précédente” (p. 299). 
20 “Le sommet du bonheur humain réside dans la soumission la plus absolue. . . . Voyez-
vous, poursuivit-il, l’islam accepte le monde, et il l’accepte dans son intégralité, il 
accepte le monde tel quel, pour parler comme Nietzsche. Le point de vue du bouddhisme 
est que le monde est dukkha—inadéquation, souffrance. Le christianisme lui-même 
manifeste de sérieuses réserves—Satan n’est-il pas qualifié de “prince de ce monde” ? 
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philosophical legitimation, however, the conversion of the intellectual 
elite seems primarily driven by pragmatic reasons: lack of courage to 
resist, indifferent uncertainty about why it would matter if France were 
turned into a Muslim country, the temptation of pleasure (polygamy), and 
simple opportunism (the opportunity to continue teaching, and with a 
better salary, in the Islamic Sorbonne). As Klaus Ove Knausgaard (2015) 
puts it, the novel’s “satire is directed toward the intellectual classes, 
among whom no trace is found of idealism, and not a shadow of will to 
defend any set of values, only pragmatism pure and simple.” The novel 
depicts the reductio ad absurdum of a world taken over by indifference 
and opportunism, where people just want to get on with their lives, with 
as little pain and as much pleasure as possible.  
In the novel, experience in the narrative present is historically and 
narratively mediated. The subjects of political action and inaction live in a 
space of experience conditioned by their historical world and its 
narratives; their historical situation sets certain limits to what is possible 
for them to think, experience, and do. For example, it is a world in which 
most Westerners take for granted the capitalist market system. The leader 
of the moderate Muslim party “understood that the pro-growth right had 
won the ‘war of ideas,’ that young people today had become 
entrepreneurs, and that no one saw any alternative to the free market” (p. 
125).21 But the novel depicts not only the historically conditioned 
experience of people living in a particular socio-historical world but also 
history in the process of its making. The war of the ideas is a war of 
narratives, and although the capitalist narrative has “won” and now 
mediates the historical experience of the inhabitants of that world, it is 
still a world in which competing narratives are struggling for power, and 
these competing narratives project different futures. The present is a time 
of political turmoil when the future is radically open, unsettled, and there 
are many alternative paths which the social development can take.  
Submission is a literary narrative that prompts us to reflect on the 
possible and on how narratives limit and expand our sense of the possible. 
It not only imagines the possibility of the rise of Islam in Europe but also 
explores how our sense of the possible is constituted and transformed in a 
dialogical relation to cultural narratives. Our first reaction to the idea of 
                                                                                                                                        
Pour l’islam au contraire la création divine est parfaite, c’est un chef-d’œuvre absolu” 
(pp. 260–261). 
21 “la droite libérale avait gagné la « bataille des idées », il l’avait parfaitement compris, 
les jeunes étaient devenus entreprenariaux, et le caractère indépassable de l’économie de 
marché était à présent unanimement admis” (p. 153). 
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France becoming an Islamic country is likely to be disbelief, but the novel 
invites us to consider how that may not be quite as impossible as we first 
thought, and perhaps even more importantly, to see that many things that 
are first met with disbelief become part of “normalcy” as new cultural 
narratives gain impetus. The protagonist cites the Trojan War and the rise 
of Nazism in the 1930s:  
 
History is full of such blindness: we see it among the intellectuals, 
politicians and journalists of the 1930s, all of whom were 
convinced that Hitler would ‘come to see reason’. It may well be 
impossible for people who have lived and prospered under a given 
social system to imagine the point of view of those who feel it 
offers them nothing, and who can contemplate its destruction 
without any particular dismay. (p. 44)22 
 
In the novel, narrative practices are ways of weaving the past, present, 
and future into one trajectory, and the present is the site where conflicting 
narrative trajectories are negotiated. Narratives told by different political 
groups harness the past to serve divergent visions of the future. The far-
right anti-immigrant movement, for example, begins to call itself the 
“nativist movement,” allegedly representing the “Indigenous Europeans”:  
 
We are the indigenous people of Europe, the first occupants of the 
land. They said, We’re against Muslim occupation—and we’re 
also against American companies and against the new capitalists 
from India, China, et cetera, buying up our heritage. They were 
clever, they quoted Geronimo, Cochise and Sitting Bull. (p. 55)23  
 
                                                        
22 “Un tel aveuglement n’avait rien d’historiquement inédit : on aurait pu retrouver le 
même chez les intellectuels, politiciens et journalistes des années 1930, unanimement 
persuadés qu’Hitler « finirait par revenir à la raison ». Il est probablement impossible, 
pour des gens ayant vécu et prospéré dans un système social donné, d’imaginer le point 
de vue de ceux qui, n’ayant jamais rien eu à attendre de ce système, envisagent sa 
destruction sans frayeur particulière” (p. 56). 
23 “Nous sommes les indigènes de l'Europe, les premiers occupants de cette terre, et nous 
refusons la colonisation musulmane ; nous refusons également les firmes américaines et 
le rachat de notre patrimoine par les nouveaux capitalistes venus d'Inde, de Chine, etc. 
Ils citaient Géronimo, Cochise, Sitting Bull, ce qui était plutôt adroit” (pp. 68–69). 
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The present is a heterogenous site of struggle between competing political 
narratives, each of which leads to a different future.24 People come from 
different religious and socio-cultural backgrounds, and they are at 
different phases of life. François’s range of interests differs remarkably 
from those of the young:  
 
For them it was all just starting to mean something, and for me 
nothing mattered except which Indian dinner I’d microwave 
(Chicken Biryani? Chicken Tikka Masala? Chicken Rogan Josh?) 
while I watched the political talk shows on France 2. (p. 27)25 
 
The novel itself is about imagining a possible future, but it also shows 
how our orientation to the future—our horizon of expectation and sense 
of futurity—is linked to how we narrate the past. The narrator suggests 
that we are still living in the spiritual space defined by the crisis of 
humanism in the aftermath of the Second World War, facing the dead end 
implicated in that crisis: “Freud was not wrong, and neither was Thomas 
Mann: if France and Germany, the two most advanced, civilized nations 
in the world, could unleash this senseless slaughter, then Europe was 
dead” (pp. 214–215).26 The different political narratives present 
competing versions of how to interpret this crisis and the way out. The 
narrator believes that the decline of Europe is as inevitable as the decline 
of the Roman empire was: “The facts were plain: Europe had reached a 
point of such putrid decomposition that it could no longer save itself, any 
more than fifth-century Rome could have done” (pp. 230–231).27 The 
Muslim Brotherhood, in turn, aims at “the rebuilding of the Roman 
Empire” (p. 164), which involves shifting “Europe’s centre of gravity 
                                                        
24 On the present as heterogenous, as a “coming together of different, but equally 
‘present’ temporalities,” i.e., as a “disjunctive unity of present times,” see Osborne 
(2013, p. 44); and on how each age consists of the “co-presence of heterogeneous 
temporalities,” see Rancière (2013, p. 26). 
25 “Pour eux il commençait à y avoir un enjeu et pour moi plus du tout, à part choisir le 
plat indien que je ferais réchauffer au micro-ondes le soir (Chicken Biryani ? Chicken 
Tikka Masala ? Chicken Rogan Josh ?) en regardant le débat politique sur France 2” (p. 
37). 
26 “Freud ne s’y est pas trompé, Thomas Mann pas davantage : si la France et 
l’Allemagne, les deux nations les plus avancées, les plus civilisées du monde, pouvaient 
s’abandonner à cette boucherie insensée, alors c'est que l’Europe était morte” (p. 257). 
27 “Il fallait se rendre à l'évidence : parvenue à un degré de décomposition répugnant, 
l’Europe occidentale n’était plus en état de se sauver elle-même—pas davantage que ne 
l’avait été la Rome antique au Ve siècle de notre ère” (p. 276). 
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towards the south” and making France “a great Arab power” (pp. 128–
129).28 
As the narrator-protagonist tells the story of the events unfolding 
around him, his sense of what is possible is far from settled—it is 
changing, vague, and ambiguous—and he thematizes this very ambiguity 
and uncertainty: “At this point, it’s hard to say what is, or isn’t, possible. 
Anyone who tells you otherwise is either a fool or a liar” (p. 51).29 After 
the Muslim Brotherhood gains power, French society goes through a 
major change, women begin to wear veils, and the new order soon comes 
to appear just as normal, necessary, and inevitable as the old order 
appeared earlier. The novel shows that narratives are not mere 
representations—they have performative power to transform political 
reality. Those whose narratives win over people’s hearts and minds have 
power to change the world. The novel suggests that we are just as 
vulnerable to political extremism as Europe was in the 1930s. The 
temptation of submission is the temptation to follow a narrative that is 
provided for us instead of taking the initiative in the Arendtian sense and 
creating one’s own narrative.  
The novel shows the threefold historicity of experience: the 
historical world and its dominant narratives affect how people experience 
the events, but they do not determine those responses; the narrative 
agency of the subjects of action and experience consists in their capacity 
to participate in shaping the course of history and in the power struggle 
between competing narratives. These narratives include those that 
reinterpret history in order to transform the space of experience in the 
present. Even if the agency of most people remains weak and fragile, this 
does not change the fact that while their experience is narratively 
mediated, they are also agents of narrative change. 
Houellebecq’s novels present no clear-cut answers to any of the 
questions that haunt the reader. Their protagonists are troubled, conflicted 
hedonists and atheists in search of love and meaning. They often see their 
own predicament clearly and insightfully—and narrate it with a good 
dose of black humor and self-irony—and nevertheless remain trapped in 
the form of life that they despise. Their narrative agency remains limited 
but at the same time their narration performatively shows how the 
                                                        
28 “La reconstruction de l’Empire romain” (p. 198), “le centre de gravité de l’Europe 
vers le Sud”; “d’une grande politique arabe de la France” (p. 157). 
29 “Vous voyez, il est bien difficile de dire en ce moment ce qui est, ou non, 
possible. Si quelqu’un vient vous prétendre le contraire, ce sera un imbécile ou 
un menteur” (p. 64). 
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dominant system is being perpetuated without it being necessary. 
Houellebecq’s novels engage in complex narrative reflection on our 
condition as narrative agents, on the cultural narratives in which we are 




In this article, I have drawn on the trajectory through which I have 
come to see narrative as a productive lens for exploring our condition as 
self-interpreting animals, that is, the complex temporality of our being in 
the world as social and cultural beings who embark on action in response 
to perceived and imagined possibilities. Our existence is inseparable from 
our self-interpretations and our ways of imagining the past and the future, 
and narrative plays a crucial role in these interpretations and imaginings. I 
have argued here for conceptualizing narrative as an interpretative 
activity of cultural sense-making that has a dialogical, performative 
dimension and is integral to how we understand our past, present, and 
future possibilities. Such a conception acknowledges the existential-
ontological significance of narratives for human existence and the 
cultural, social, and historical embeddedness of our narrative agency. It 
presents the subject not only as socially and historically conditioned but 
also as capable of agency, and it takes into account the processual, 
dynamic nature of our being as a constant process of becoming. The 
performative approach of narrative hermeneutics explores narratives as 
culturally-mediated, ethically and politically charged interpretative 
practices that have real world effects. 
I have also argued here for a more historical conception of 
experience and narrative. Our historical imagination is shaped through 
processes of narrative (re)interpretation, and our narrative imagination 
always has a historical dimension. It is intimately linked to a sense of 
history—a sense of where we are coming from and where we are going 
and of our present historical world as space of possibilities shaped by 
historical processes. This perspective allows us to analyze how narratives 
contribute to historical imagination by cultivating our sense of how our 
narrative interpretations are historically mediated, how the ways we 
narrate the past shape our space of experience in the present, and how we 
as agents of narrative practices take part in constituting history. 
Narratives are interpretations that explore human possibilities. Our 
sense of the possible in the present is shaped by how we understand the 
past, orient ourselves to the future, and narratively integrate the different 
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temporal dimensions of our historical and narrative imagination. My work 
as a literary and narrative scholar is fueled by the conviction that narrative 
fiction plays an important role both in imagining the past and in 
prompting us to address our futurity through visions of alternative futures. 
Literary narratives provide interpretations of our narratively shaped space 
of possibilities, and these interpretations take part in shaping our sense of 
the possible in the present. This is integral to the potential of literature to 
strengthen our (mostly fragile) narrative agency—both by critically 
reflecting on how we participate in perpetuating the narrative webs in 
which we are entangled and by proposing ways to reinterpret, challenge, 
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